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Abstract 
 
A considerable body of economic literature shows the adverse economic impacts of 
oil-price shocks for the developed economies. However, there has been a lack of empirical 
study of this kind on China and other developing countries. This paper attempts to fill this 
gap by answering how and to what extent oil-price shocks impact China’s economy, 
emphasizing on the price transmission mechanisms. To that end, we develop a structural 
vector auto-regressive model. Our results show that an oil-price increase negatively 
affects output and investment, but positively affects inflation rate and interest rate. 
However, with the differentiated price control policies for materials and intermediates on 
the one hand and final products on the other hand in China, the impact on real economy, 
represented by real output and real investment, lasts much longer than that to 
price/monetary variables. Our decomposition results also show that the short-term impact, 
namely output decrease induced by the cut of capacity-utilization rate, is greater in the 
first one to two years, but the portion of the long-term impact, defined as the impact 
realized through an investment change, increases steadily and exceeds that of short-term 
impact at the end of the second year. Afterwards, the long-term impact dominates, and 
maintains for quite some time.  
 
 
JEL classification: Q43; Q41; Q48; O13; O53; P22; E22; E23 
 
 
Keywords: Structural vector auto-regressive model; Unit root test; Error-correction model; 
Oil-price shocks; Price transmission mechanisms; Investment; Output; Producer/consumer 
price index; Census X-12 approach; China 
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1. Introduction 
1.1.  Oil prices and economic activities  
The world has witnessed a continuous oil-price climb that lasts as long as 
astonishingly 5 years before a sharp downturn, leaving a historical record of US$147 per 
barrel in July 2008. The adverse impact of such oil-price shocks on the global economy 
has long been observed. Intuitively, rising oil prices preceded almost all of the recessions 
since 1965 (see the periods between dotted lines in Fig. 1). Analytically, Hamilton (1983) 
argued that oil-price increases were at least partially responsible for every post-World War 
II (WWII) U.S. recession except the one in 1960; Brown and Yucel (2002) pointed out 
that rising oil prices preceded eight of the nine post-WWII economic recessions.  
Over the past three decades, a considerable body of economic studies has been 
devoted, following Hamilton’s seminal paper, to exploring the relationship between 
oil-price shocks and the aggregate economic performance of various nations (Burbridge 
and Harrison, 1984; Gisser and Goodwin, 1986; Mork and Olson, 1994; Lee and Ratti, 
1995; Lee et al., 2001; Cologni and Manera, 2008). All of these studies can broadly be 
classified into the three categories. The first category includes those studies that have 
investigated the theoretical mechanisms and channels through which the oil-price increase 
may retard economic activity (Bruno and Sachs 1982; Hooker 1996; Hamilton, 1996; 
Brown and Yucel 2002). The second category of studies has focused mainly on the 
empirical investigation of the relationship between oil-price change and national 
aggregate economic activity. Either linear or non-linear, either symmetric or asymmetric, 
the mathematical relationship were verified for most of the developed countries over the 
1970s to the 1990s (Ludos, 2004; Cunado and Gracia, 2003; Lee et al., 2001; Lee and Ni 
2002; Lardic and Mignon 2006). The remaining studies in this field have targeted on the 
role of macroeconomic policies in dealing with the oil-price shock. They have examined 
the possibility of a weakening relationship between oil-price fluctuation and aggregate 
economic activity (Huang et al., 2005; Cologni and Manera, 2008). Given that the 
slowdown of total output and inflation are widely considered as the two inevitable impacts 
of oil-price fluctuations, the majority of studies are seeking to design appropriate 
monetary policies aimed at coping with the oil supply shock. 
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Fig. 1  
Crude oil price and world economic growth 
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Sources: Crude oil price data are from BP Statistical Review of World Energy; the world 
GDP growth rate data are from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
 
1.2.  What is going on in China? 
Rapid increase of oil price since 2003 has caused great concerns worldwide. Most of 
the theoretical and empirical studies so far have acknowledged that sharp increase of oil 
price may exert an influence on the economic activity and macroeconomic policies. 
However, in an international context, such influence may vary country by country due to 
their different economic structure, energy intensity, energy mix and dependence on 
international energy market. China’s oil consumption doubled over the past decade, and 
the economic growth is highly energy intensive (see Fig 2). The current energy 
consumption per US$1000 GDP of China is 0.57 tones of oil equivalent (toe), higher than 
those of Germany (0.09), Japan (0.12) and the U.S. (0.17). The energy efficiency of 
industries in China is also very low: energy consumption per unit of output for cement is 
53% higher than the world’s average; that of glass is 47% higher; Petro-chemicals 45%; 
and alkali 34%. Moreover, China’s dependence on imported oil increased to over 52% in 
2007 (BP, 2008). Therefore, China could not have avoided the oil shock without any 
economic losses. However, the empirical evidence seems to suggest otherwise. Like most 
of the emerging economies, China has accomplished spectacular economic development 
in the new century. Over the period of 2000 to 2007, China’s GDP had grown at the 
average annual rate of 9.76% per year, the rate topping all the economies groupings in 
Figure 3. 
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Fig. 2  
Cross-nation comparison of energy intensity and efficiency 
 
Sources: energy consumption data are from 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2008); GDP data are from the World Bank’s WDI 
database; and energy efficiency data are from China Energy Statistical Yearbook, 2008. 
 
Fig. 3  
Average annual GDP growth rates for the past five decades 
 
G
D
P grow
th rate (%
)
Source: The World Bank’s WDI database. 
 
Does that suggest that China is less vulnerable to oil shocks than other economies? If 
not, is there any possibility for hysteresis in the impact of oil shock? Unfortunately, most 
of the empirical studies to date have been conducted for the developed nations, and there 
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has been a lack of empirical evidences for developing countries. In this paper, we attempt 
to fill this gap by answering how and to what extent oil-price shocks impact China’s 
economy. The paper emphasizes on the investigation of the transmission mechanisms. 
Specifically, it will focus on the following two issues: 1) how are the conventional 
transmission mechanisms modified in the specific context of China; and 2) how do the 
adverse impact of oil-price shock and its robustness change in the long run in China? 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the transmission channels 
through which oil-price changes affect the macroeconomic variables. Section 3 provides a 
partial equilibrium analysis of such transmission mechanisms and their effects on the 
macroeconomic indices of China. The overall impact of oil-price shock is analyzed in 
Section 4 using a structural vector auto-regressive model. On that base, we disentangle the 
long-term impact from the overall impact in Section 5. Section 6 presents key findings 
and conclusions. 
 
2. The Transmission mechanisms 
2.1. Transmission channels 
From a theoretical perspective, oil-price changes affect the performances of 
macroeconomic variables through the following six transmission channels (Brown and 
Yucel, 2002): 
• Supply-side shock effect: focusing on the direct impact on output due to the 
change in marginal producing costs caused by oil-price shock; 
• Wealth transfer effect: emphasizing on the different marginal consumption rate of 
petrodollar and that of ordinary trade surplus; 
• Inflation effect: analyzing relationship between domestic inflation and oil prices; 
• Real balance effect: investigating the change in money demand and monetary 
policy; 
• Sector adjustment effect: estimating the adjustment cost of industrial structure, 
which is mainly used to explain the asymmetry in oil-price shock impact; 
• Unexpected effect: focusing on the uncertainty about oil price and its impact.  
These channels have been proved to be valid in industrialized countries. However, 
whether they still hold in China is an open question. Fig. 4 holds the main idea. 
Crude oil is one of the most fundamental and crucial raw materials for industrial 
production, and the change in its price can affect the output directly. As Arrow ① in 
Figure 4 indicates, oil-price shocks can increase the marginal cost of production in many 
industries, and thus reduce the production. This is referred to as the supply-side shock 
effect. The reduction of output due to the cut of capacity utilization can recover quickly 
within the range of capacity. However, oil-price shocks also have long-term effect on 
output which is carried out through Price/Monetary Transmission Mechanism (Arrow ③).  
Cost shocks in the upper stream industry can be transmitted from producers and 
sectors to end-users. A well developed industrial chain can transmit inflationary shock 
from upper stream to down stream, leaving the producers’ profit rate slightly affected. 
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That can raise the overall cost for consumers and producers, thus reducing the consumers’ 
real balance. This transmission ends up with the reduction of consumption and the real 
output as well. This is the story witnessed in most developed countries. But in China, 
hackneyed price controls, surplus production due to limited domestic demand and tough 
price competition in exporting sectors make the output prices very sticky (Arrow ④).  
Because of the limited space for mark-up, down stream producers could only reduce 
their profit to assimilate the cost increase, which would doubtlessly cause the decrease in 
their investment. Since investment determines the increase of production capacity, i.e. the 
potential output ability, which cannot recover in a short period of time even when the cost 
shock disappears, a decrease in investment would abate output in the long run. In our view, 
this channel is more important and dominant in China.  
Real balance decrease can enlarge money demand in the market while investment 
decrease can lessen it, so the net impact of an oil-price shock on interest rate is unclear, 
neither does the corresponding monetary policy needed. But in the present age, monetary 
authorities set the target of their policy as controlling inflation. When the observed 
inflation is caused by cost shocks including oil-price increases, a contractionary monetary 
policy can worsen the long-term output by increased interest rate and decreased 
investment. Bernanke et al. (1997) find that a positive innovation in oil price is followed 
by a rise in the federal fund rate, and this kind of monetary policy tightening accounted 
for about two-thirds to three-quarters of the reduction in U.S. output subsequent to an oil 
shock. A contractionary monetary policy can also be found in China since 2003, illustrated 
by continuously raising interest rates. To what extent the tightening monetary policy has 
affected China’s output is an interesting question, but that goes beyond the scope of the 
paper. 
 
Fig. 4  
Transmission channels of oil-price shocks 
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3. Partial equilibrium analysis of the transmission mechanisms 
3.1. Data 
In order to test the validity of transmission mechanisms, we employ some 
macroeconomic variables of China, denoted as follows:  
• Real Oil-Price (RP) is the adjusted WTI spot crude price in 1995 Chinese Yuan. 
Aside from RP, we introduce Positive/Negative Difference of Oil-Price 
(PDP/NDP) and Net Oil-Price Increase (NPI), which were put forward by 
Hamilton (1985), to capture the asymmetry in the impact of oil-price shock on 
economy; 
• Consumer/Producer Price Index (CPI/PPI) are in chain-indices; 
• Real Rate of Return for Industrial Companies (RRT) is the ratio of profit and 
capital occupation of product, minus PPI; 
• Real Interest Rate (RI) is one year loan rate, minus CPI; 
• Real Investment toward Industry (INV) is in constant price (1995 Chinese Yuan); 
• Real Industrial Added Value (IAV) is employed to indicate aggregate output, also 
in constant price (1995 Chinese Yuan). 
The sample period is from February 1998 to August 2008, including 127 original 
observations. The oil prices data are taken from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov); the macro-economic variables of China are 
derived from the Wind Financial Database named WindDB 
(http://www.wind.com.cn/en/product/windDB.htm). Census X-12 approach is utilized to 
eliminate seasonal fluctuations from INV, IAV and RRT. There are no evidences for 
seasonal patterns in CPI, PPI and RP series (see Table 1).  
The census X-12 approach is developed by the U.S. Census Bureau in the late 1990s, 
for decomposition/adjustment of seasonal time series. It is adapted from the Bureau’s well 
known X-11 procedure (Shiskin, Young and Musgrave, 1967).1 The core algorithm of 
Census X-12 approach is based on an Auto-Rregressive Integrated Moving Average 
(ARIMA) model. The multiplicative form of decomposition was used in this analysis:  
tttt ISTCY ⋅⋅=  
where Yt is the original series, TCt is the trend cycle, St is the seasonal factors, and It 
stands for irregular component. There are three more forms of decompositions:  
• Additive: ;  tttt ISTCY ++=
• Pseudo-additive: ;  )1( −+= tttt ISTCY
• Log-additive: .  tttt ISTCY lnlnlnln ++=
                                                              
1 See Findley et al. (1998) and Ladiray and Quenneville (2001) for more detailed 
discussion on Census X-12 seasonal adjustment approach, and the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
website (www.census.gov/ srd/www/x12a) for up-to-date documentation of the 
X-12-ARIMA program and the program itself. 
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Before further econometric analysis, we also test the unit root features of all those 
aforementioned series, in order to check their stationarity. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
with Schwarz Info Criterion for lag-length is utilized for addressing the stationarity, and 
all the results (see Table 1) are at the 1% significance level. 
 
Table 1  
Data processing and the testing results  
Variable 
Seasonal adjustment 
(*_SA) 
Logarithm conversion 
(L-*) 
Stationarity 
RP  √ I(1) 
NPI/PDP/NDP   I(0) 
CPI  √ I(0) 
PPI  √ I(0) 
RRT √ √ I(0) 
RI   I(1) 
INV √ √ I(1) 
IAV √ √ I(1) 
Notes: “√” indicates that the corresponding series are adjusted or converted before being 
employed in the following econometric analysis. 
I(0) indicates stationary series; I(1) stands for the first-order integrated series. 
 
3.2. Crude oil price and domestic inflation rate 
Our empirical study shows the stickiness of price change in China. According to 
Auto-regressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model, PPI is positively related to both NPI and 
the first-order difference of log(RP), denoted as D(LRP). As column (1) of Table 2 
indicates, the coefficients of NPI to PPI is 0.073 and that of NPI(-1) is 0.113, both are 
significant at the 1% level according to the t-statics test. This positive relationship fades 
away after 2 periods. None of the coefficients of NPI(-2), NPI(-3) and NPI(-4) passed the 
t-statistics test at the 10% significance level. This trend also exist for those of D(LRP)s 
(see column (3) in Table 2). Granger Causality test shows the robust relationship between 
oil price and PPI (see the lower half of Table 2). Furthermore, the coefficients of 
immediate period items (D(LRP), NPI) are smaller and less significant than those of 
lagged items (D(LRP(-1)), NPI(-1)). This means that the impact of oil-price shock 
emerges gradually, and it takes about 2-3 months to complete the inflationary 
transmission.  
While the impact of oil price on PPI is robust and significant, its impact on CPI is 
very weak (see column (2) and (4) in Table 2). There is no evidence for direct relationship 
between oil price and China’s CPI. But PPI does have impact on CPI, which enables the 
oil-price shocks to transmit through to CPI, though very indirectly and lagged. That 
illustrates the aforementioned incompleteness in the price transmission in China. Thanks 
to the stickiness and hysteresis, PPI would increase along with oil price, while CPI is 
more likely to remain stable. As a result, consumption would not be severely affected by 
oil price. However, if we interpret PPI as price index for industrial outputs, most of which 
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are intermediate goods and will be ploughed into reproduction, then an increase in PPI 
will surely boost the production costs and reduce producers’ profit. That will cause the 
reduction in both short-term and long-term outputs. In developed countries where 
commodity prices are flexible and market-oriented, the oil shock affects more on 
consumption but less on production. Compared with that, the price transmission 
mechanism in China is more sticky, and that makes the adverse impact of oil-price shocks 
in China last much longer. Section 5 provides more discussion on this issue. 
 
 
Table 2  
Statistical relationship between CPI, PPI and real oil price 
 
PPI 
(1) 
CPI 
(2) 
 
PPI 
(3) 
CPI 
(4) 
NPI 
0.073435* 
(2.880377) 
-0.023662 
(-0.877187) 
D(LRP) 
0.008300** 
(1.969272) 
-0.001048 
(-0.223929) 
NPI(-1) 
0.113339* 
(4.414026) 
-0.014764 
(-0.519768) 
D(LRP(-1)) 
0.025579* 
(5.904055) 
-0.002399 
(-0.452184) 
NPI(-2) 
-0.012488 
(-0.482338) 
-0.004889 
(-0.181340) 
D(LRP(-2)) 
0.015544 
(3.594552) 
-0.003694 
(-0.753845) 
NPI(-3) 
-0.019945 
(-0.774680) 
0.000367 
(0.013797) 
D(LRP(-3)) 
-0.004017 
(-0.935650) 
0.001946 
(0.418679) 
NPI(-4) 
0.013125 
(0.498478) 
0.003796 
(0.138227) 
D(LRP(-4)) 
0.006841 
(1.624671) 
-0.001253 
(-0.265234) 
PPI / 
0.166348** 
(1.813180) 
PPI / 
0.171281*** 
(1.718762) 
Trend 
7.31E-05* 
(5.105160) 
3.80E-05* 
(3.174597) 
Trend 
6.74E-05* 
(5.254080) 
3.83E-05* 
(3.164357) 
C 
4.593064* 
(1801.369) 
3.833797* 
(9.097837) 
C 
4.594655* 
(2032.556) 
3.810800* 
(8.321916) 
AR(1) 
0.346512* 
(4.037418) 
0.030811 
(0.323568) 
AR(1) 
0.301800* 
(3.453512) 
0.041931 
(0.438984) 
Granger Causality Test 
NPIÆPPI* D(LRP)ÆPPI* 
PPIÆNPI PPIÆD(LRP) 
NPIÆCPI D(LRP)ÆCPI 
CPIÆNPI CPIÆD(LRP) 
PPIÆCPI** PPIÆCPI** 
CPIÆPPI* CPIÆPPI*2
Notes: * 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; ***10% significance level. 
T-statistics are listed in the parenthesis.  
                                                              
2 The significant causality from CPI to PPI can be explained by demand effect. On the 
one hand, increased CPI can boost the costs of living, and thus promote the workers to 
demand for higher wage. On the other hand, CPI includes the price of services like 
transportation which is also an important part of production.  
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3.3. Crude oil price and industrial output 
The increase in crude oil price raises the input costs of production and thus reduces 
production. Aimed at maximizing their profits, producers choose a proper capacity- 
utilization rate with respect to their marginal cost and profits. Once the disadvantageous 
situation disappears, the output can recover soon within the limit of capacity. So the 
oil-price shock can affect the aggregate output immediately and directly by pushing 
production costs up. We use the first-order difference equation to estimate the short-term 
relationship between variables. The results show that output is negatively related to both 
oil price and domestic inflation rate (CPI). The impact of oil price has hysteresis, 
illustrated by the significance of relationship between IAV and NPI(-1) (see the left 
column in Table 3).  
 
Table 3  
Oil price, inflation and short-term output 
 Difference equation Error-correction model (ECM) 
D(INV) 
0.018717 
(0.570914) 
0.114723* 
(3.199646) 
CPI 
-4.153096* 
(-5.338682) 
-3.774201* 
(-4.950024) 
PPI 
2.209699* 
(3.122402) 
0.9828313 
(1.349837) 
NPI 
-0.236461 
(-1.015402) 
-0.185079 
(-0.870837) 
NPI(-1) 
-0.427610*** 
(-1.779239) 
-0.383127*** 
(-1.732961) 
trend / 
0.000231** 
(2.353463) 
C 
8.969276** 
(2.322941) 
12.83332* 
(2.978209) 
ecm / 
-0.280064* 
(-4.667372) 
Notes: * 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; ***10% significance level. 
T-statistics are listed in the parenthesis.  
 
While this short-term effect of oil-price shocks in China is perspicuous and 
statistically significant, in our view, the aforementioned long-term effect is more crucial, 
given the stickiness of price transmission in China. Concerning our assumption that 
investment determines potential output capacity, we check the cointegration relationship 
between IAV and INV (t-statistics are shown in parentheses below the coefficients): 
ε+⋅+⋅+= trendINVIAV 007416.0451055.0690967.3  
                                                              
3 The impact of PPI on output is ambiguous, because of its duality as price index of both 
input and output. For a detailed analysis, see Appendix 1. 
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(27.91022)  (13.13232)      (10.93728) 
The stationarity of the residual series is checked using the ADF,4 PP and KPSS 
approaches, all indicating I(0) at the 1% significance level. That indicates the existence of 
cointegration relationship between investment and output. Taking the long-term 
relationship into account, we can establish an Error-Correction Model (ECM), and the 
results are more legible (listed on the right column in Table 3). 
The cointegration relationship reinforces the argument that investment determines 
long term output. To separate the long-term effect from the overall effect of an oil price 
shock, a rigorous analysis is carried out using a structural vector auto-regressive model in 
section 4. But before that, we first investigate the determinants of investment, in both the 
short term and long term.  
Aside from economic aggregates, interest rate and profit rate also determine 
investment by changing the costs and benefits of investment. Since profit rate (RRT) is 
trend stationary, we test the cointegration relationship among INV, IAV and RI (t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses below the coefficients): 
ε+⋅−⋅−⋅+−= trendRIIAVINV 002206.0007105.0309048.1186414.3  
       (-5.997389)  (13.10814)      (-1.053999)     (-1.272779) 
The residual series is I(0) according to the ADF, PP and KPSS tests at the 1% 
significance level. Table 4 provides the ECM results about the determinant of investment. 
As we can see, investment is highly related to profit rate and interest rate. And further 
empirical research reveals that there is a negative relationship between industrial 
companies’ profit rate and domestic inflation rate5, and oil price as well (see Table 5). 
 
Table 4  
Determinants of investment 
 D(IAV) D(RI) RRT RESID(-1) 
D(INV) 
0.478507* 
(2.739867) 
-0.024081** 
(-2.237191) 
0.002926* 
(1.957527) 
-0.618147* 
(-9.187698) 
Notes: * 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; ***10% significance level. 
T-statistics are listed in the parenthesis.  
 
Table 5  
Oil prices, inflation ratio and profit rate 
 CPI NPI(-1) NPI(-2) NPI(-3) trend C AR(1) 
RRT 
-1.313983* 
(-8.107257) 
-0.113699** 
(-2.043205) 
-0.217713* 
(-3.506933) 
-0.088625*** 
(-1.571810) 
10.58951* 
(14.20591) 
0.000838* 
(11.95349) 
0.698481* 
(10.81186) 
Notes: * 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; ***10% significance level. 
                                                              
4 Since what we test here is the residual series of cointegration regression, it is more likely 
to reject the null hypothesis according to the ordinary critical level of t-values. So here we 
apply the critical t-values put forward by MacKinnon (1991). 
5 The impact of PPI on profit rate is unclear, due also to its duality. See Appendix 1 for 
details.  
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t-statistics are listed in the parenthesis.  
PPI and NPI are not included in the equation, because their coefficients fail to pass 
the significance test.  
 
3.4. Brief summary of transmission mechanisms in China 
An increase in crude oil price can affect the short term output of an economy by 
directly raising the marginal cost for industrial production and change the 
profit-maximizing capacity-utilizing rate. Once the disadvantageous situation disappears, 
the production can recover soon within the limit of capacity. But there are some effects of 
oil-price shock that cannot recover quickly. Change in production cost would affect profit 
rate of producers, which is the primary profit of investment. Given the fact that investment 
determines output in the long run, the long-term effect of oil shock is more important than 
the short-term effect. 
Price controls, surplus production caused by limited domestic demand, excessive 
price competition in international trade make the CPI very sticky in China. The stickiness 
and hysteresis of the inflationary shock transmission cut the profit rate of producers which 
cause the reduction in both short-term and long-term outputs. Compared with developed 
countries, the baffled price transmission mechanism in China makes the adverse impact of 
inflationary shocks more serious and permanent.  
 
4. General equilibrium analysis by the SVAR model 
4.1. Specification of the SVAR model 
For a general equilibrium analysis for 
longer term, we establish a Structural 
Vector Auto-Regressive (SVAR) model.  
We start with a reduced-form Vector 
Auto-Regressive (VAR) model, in order to 
describe the transmission system of 
oil-price shock in China. According to the 
aforementioned transmission mechanisms, 
oil-price shock can affect output directly, 
and at the same time increase domestic 
inflation rate. Given the stickiness of price 
transmission in China, the increased 
inflation rate will cut producers’ profit rate which, together with interest rate, determines 
investment. Figure 5 summarizes the transmission mechanism. Four key explanatory 
variables (NPI, CPI, I, INV) that have direct impact on output and one explained variable 
(IAV) are introduced into the VAR(k) model: 
Fig. 5 Diagrammatic sketch for the 
transmission mechanisms of oil-price shock 
ti itit
k μXAcX +∑+= = −10  
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Xt is the vector of the five endogenous variables, { }NPICPIIINVIAV ,,,,= tttttt′X ;  
μt is the vector of residuals, which are used to estimate the structural restrictions; 
c0 and Ai are vector/matrix for constants and coefficients which need to be estimated;  
k is the number of lagged terms. VAR estimations are very sensitive to lag structure 
of variables. A sufficient lag length does help to reflect the long-term impact of variables 
on others, but adding lag length will cause collinearity problems, let alone lessen the 
degrees of freedom (DOF). For any k ≥11, the model will become divergent with at least 
one Auto-Regressive Roots greater than unit. According to sequential modified Likelihood 
Ratio test static (LR), lag order of 1-3 is the best for our model (k=3)6. 
Since only the lagged terms are listed on the right-hand side of VAR equation, a 
reduced-form VAR model is unable to analyze the contemporanous relationship among 
variables, which causes cross-correlation among residual series, i.e. the covariance matrix 
of residuals . Although it does not affect the unbiasness and efficiency of 
the estimation, the contemporoneous relationship may affect the impulse response 
ramarkably. So we introduce the contemporaneous coefficients matrix B into the VAR 
model as structural restrictions: 
IμμΣ ≠′= )( ttE
∑ ++= = −ki titit 100 εXBcXB  
B0 is a k*k non-identity matrix (note that if B0 is an identity matrix, then the SVAR 
model would retrogress into a reduced-form VAR model), εt is a k*1 vector of residuals 
which satisfies the condition that , that is, the residuals are uncorrelated white 
noise series. Rewrite a reduced-form VAR in lag operator: 
Iεε =′ )( ttE
ttL μXA =)(  
Assume that there is a invertible matrix Bk*k: 
tttL εBμXBA ==)(  
Since , and ∑ is already identified by μt, we have 
actually applied k(k+1)/2 restrictions, and we need another k(k−1)/2 restrictions to identify 
the structural restriction matrix B.  
IBBΣBμBμεε =′=′=′ )()( tttt EE
For the extra 10 restrictions, we turn to the economic theory. It is reasonable to 
                                                              
6 The unit root test indicated that IAV, INV and I employed in the VAR model are I(1) 
series, but the nonstationary problem can be absorbed by introducing more lagged terms, 
so the theoretical stationarity assumption is not very strict. The 3 stage lag length is 
sufficient to absorb the nonstationarity, for the residual series of 5 VAR equations are all 
stationary. We also utilize the VEC module to estimate the mutual relationship among 
variables, and the result is very similar to the VAR estimation. See Appendix 2 for detailed 
analysis. 
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assume that oil price is exogenous (only) at the contemporaneous period (i.e. for t=0, b51, 
b52, b53, b54=0), and it can affect all the other four endogenous variables:  
NPIbNPI ⋅= 55 . 
The second restriction is that CPI is only determined by oil price and CPI itself, 
which means a change in interest rate, investment and output can only affect CPI in the 
subsequent periods (b41, b42, b43=0).  
NPIbCPIbCPI ⋅+⋅= 4544 . 
The third restriction specifies that interest rate does not respond to either IAV or INV, 
because of the time lag (b31, b32=0).  
NPIbCPIbIbI ⋅+⋅+⋅= 353433 . 
In the last restriction, we assume that output change does not affect investment 
immediately, but the investment change affect output instantly (b21=0). 
NPIbCPIbIbINVbINV ⋅++⋅+⋅= 25242322 ; 
NPIbCPIbIbINVbIAVbIAV ⋅++⋅+⋅+⋅= 1514131211 . 
Rewriting these restrictions in matrix form, we get a set of recursive restrictions in an 
upper-triabgle matrix B, with 15 elements to be estimated:  
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=
55
4544
353433
25242322
1514131211
0000
000
00
0
b
bb
bbb
bbbb
bbbbb
B  
With these restrictions, we can estimate the elements in matrix B with the SVAR 
modle. The estimation is denominated as : Bˆ
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−−
−
−−
=
*65.710000
71.5*13.257000
84.614.18*63.700
03.562.23*65.1*21.140
03.4*62.10127.0*99.1*34.15
Bˆ  
Notes: * 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; ***10% significance level. 
 
The cross-correlation among residual serial of the SVAR model is valid, which 
means that the structural restriction simulates the contemporaneous relationships among 
variables.  
 
4.2. Economic meanings of the SVAR analysis 
Fig. 6 shows the impact of oil-price shock, which equals to one standard deviation in 
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NPI. According to the impulse response equation, in a short period of time, oil-price shock 
can negatively affect output and investment, but positively affect interest rate, leaving its 
impact on CPI unclear. Interest rate, namely one year loan rate, is a representation of 
monetary policy. In the short run, interest soars accordingly to mitigate the inflation rate 
which is boosted up by oil price. Though CPI is not affected, PPI is very sensitive to oil 
price according to our previous analysis. Since PPI covers a larger range of products than 
CPI does, the general inflation rate would also be sensitive to oil price. Moreover, it is 
reasonable for a forward looking monetary policy to react before any change in CPI is 
observed, because there is an expectation of inflation after a serious oil-price shock. 
However in a longer term, a lower interest rate is needed to counteract the adverse 
impact.7 
 
 
5. Separation of long- and short-term impacts 
5.1. Direct approach 
Comparing the four graphs in Fig. 6, we can see that the impacts on real economy 
variables, namely output and investment, take more than 200 periods to recover (i.e. 16-17 
years), which is far more permanent than that to price/monetary variables. Interest rate 
recovers to zero in about 2 years (24 periods) after an oil-price shock, and CPI recovers 
even faster. From a Keynesian perspective, interest and inflation rates impact real output 
through investment. The cointegration test and the ECM model in Section 3 have shown 
the steady relationship between investment and output in the long run, so it is reasonable 
to define the long-term impact as the impact realized through investment change. In the 
following section, we intend to separate the long-term impact (Li) from the overall impact 
(Mi). In so doing, we follow the strategy adopted by Bernanke et al. (1997) while 
disentangling the impact of interest change from the overall impact of oil-price change. 
 
                                                              
7 Bernanke (1997) pointed out that a forward looking monetary policy tends to be 
tightening when oil price shock happens, and showed that the contractionary monetary 
policies have deteriorated the adverse impacts of high oil price. 
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Fig. 6  
Response of macroeconomic variables of China to oil-price shocks 
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b. Response of investment a. Response of industrial added value 
 
c. Response of interest rate d. Response of CPI  
 
Notes: Oil-price shock is defined as one standard deviation change in NPI. 
The belt between dotted lines is ± 2 Standard Error. 
 
Oil-price change can influence investment significantly and permanently, which 
means that the level of investment in each period contains the impacts of oil-price shock 
in the previous periods. So, if there are no shocks other than oil-price change, investment 
series can be represented in a moving average form in term of oil-price shock: 
ptpttt eaeaeaINVINV −− ++++= L1100  
et-i denotes the level of oil-price shocks, measured by times of NPI residuals (Residnpi) 
at each period to standard-deviation (S.D.npi) of NPI in the SVAR model; the moving 
average parameter ai equals to the corresponding lagged impulse response coefficients. 
For instance, a shock of one S.D. NPI will cause that response in INV equals to a1 at the 
1st period, a2 at the 2nd period, and etc. Thus, the fluctuation of investment that is 
attributed to oil price change equals to:  
124,
..1
, ≤⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛∑ = − paDS
Resid
i
p
i
npi
npiip  
and this needs to be eliminated from the original level (see Fig. 7). 
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Fig. 7  
The fluctuation of investment that can be attributed to oil-price change  
 
 
On that base, we can generate a new series of adjusted investment (INVA) devoid of 
oil-price change: 
124,
..1
, ≤⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−= ∑ = − paDS
Resid
INVINVA i
p
i
npi
npiip  
p is the number of periods that oil-price impact on investment lasts. As indicated in 
Fig. 6, the responses of investment converge to 0 after about 200 periods, which exceeds 
the sample range, so p is set to the limit of observations (p=124). 
By employing the adjusted investment data to estimate the SVAR model, we get a 
new set of impulse responses (Fig. 8). Not surprisingly, the response of investment to NPI 
is less significant and converges faster, while the Standard Error is greater. This means 
that the adjustment has successfully eliminated the oil-price impact on investment. 
Besides, the response of IAV also converges quickly compared to the original model. 
Since the adjusted investment is free to oil-price shock, the response of output could not 
have carried out through an investment change. According to our definition, this response 
is the so-called short-term impact (Si).  
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Fig. 8  
Response of macroeconomic variables using adjusted investment data 
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Fig. 9 shows the result of the separation for a range of 200 periods (Li= Mi- Si). In the 
first 20 periods, the short-term impact, namely direct output decrease induced by the cut 
of capacity-utilization rate, is greater, but the portion of long-term impact increases 
steadily and exceeds 50% after the 21st period. Afterwards, Li dominates the overall 
impact.  
In Fig. 9, we also note that after the 120 periods, the portion of Li exceeds 100%, 
which seems to be unreasonable. A possible explanation has been brought forward by 
Song and Louis (2007). They point out that energy efficiency in China has been 
significantly improved since 2002 because of the increased energy costs. The high oil 
price stimulates the producers to develop more energy-efficient or less energy-intensive 
technologies, and thus change the energy efficiency and energy intensity of China. 
However, this kind of technology improvement can only be observed while investigating 
the direct impact of oil price on output, while the long-term impact through a decrease in 
aggregate investment is unable to include this kind of change in investment structure and 
improvement in technology. The gap between Li and Mi after the 120th period can be 
partially explained by this effect. 
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Fig. 9  
The impact of oil-price change on output 
 
Notes: Mi, Si and Li indicate the overall impact, the short-term impact, and the long-term 
impact, respectively. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Oil-price shocks have both the long-term and short-term effects on economic 
performance. The short-term effect is caused mainly by the change in capacity-utilization 
ratio, while the long-term effect is due to the change in capacity itself. Since investment 
determines the potential output capacity in the long run, the long-term impact of oil-price 
shock is attributed to the decrease of investment caused by higher input costs. Our ECM 
results clearly indicate the negative short-term relationship between oil price and output: 
1% increase in oil price can reduce the output by about 0.38%. But the significance of the 
coefficient is relatively small, compared to that of investment in the cointegration equation. 
This is an illustration of the importance of investment to the long-term impact in China.  
In the free market economies, producers could mark up their products to offset the 
increased input costs due to oil-price shock, depending on the price elasticity of demand, 
and their profit rate would not be severely affected. When the disadvantageous situation 
fades away, production can recover very quickly within the range of output capacity. In 
most developed countries where markets are well established, this kind of adjustment can 
be realized very quickly. However in China, as well as in most other developing countries, 
this kind of adjustment is baffled by the distorted pricing mechanism, and oil-price shock 
impacts the economy differently. Our in-depth study on the difference in response of CPI 
and PPI to oil-price shock clearly indicates this unique price transmission mechanism in 
China. 
Prevailing price controls in China have targeted at two kinds of goods: fundamental 
industrial raw materials and CPI commodities. Intermediate products are mostly free from 
price restrictions. The price controls toward raw materials used to be capable in stabilizing 
input costs for producers and strengthening the comparative advantage which fueled the 
remarkable economic growth in China. However, with the increasing dependence on 
imported industrial raw materials like crude oil, iron ore and certain kinds of farm 
products, it is becoming increasingly difficult and impractical to control the raw material 
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prices in China. Meanwhile, the oil pricing system on domestic market went through two 
revolutions from the late 1990s to the early 2000s: the first was in 1998, which pegged the 
prices of crude and petrochemical products to Singapore market; the second was in 2001, 
two more markets, Rotterdam and New York were brought into equation. We can see that 
the domestic oil prices are becoming increasingly related to the world market, and price 
controls are losing their effectiveness gradually. According to our partial equilibrium 
analysis, PPI is positively related to oil price: 100% increase in oil price can cause 7.34% 
increase in PPI in the same month, and 11.33% in the following month. On the other hand, 
CPI commodities are still under strict restriction. Our empirical research finds no 
evidences for a direct relationship between oil price and CPI. This structure of price 
control keeps the price of final output under restriction, and at the same time leaves input 
costs floating. For consumers, the baffled price transmission mechanism stabilizes 
commodity prices even when oil-price shock happens. This can somewhat mitigate the 
short-term effect. For producers, their aggregate profit rate is more sensitive to oil-price 
shocks because of limited space for them to mark up their products. This would 
doubtlessly cause the decrease in investment, and thus amplify the long-term impact.  
Appendix 1 provides a detailed analysis of the impact of CPI and PPI in different 
sectors. The sectoral analysis shows that profit rates of upper-stream industries (including 
oil industry, nonferrous metals processing, steel-making & processing, chemical industry 
and chemical fiber industry) tend to be positively related to PPI but negatively to CPI; 
down-stream industries (including machinery manufacturing, plastic industry, food 
processing, medicine & pharmaceutical industry, textile industry and garment industry) 
tend to respond otherwise. But aggregate profit rate can be lessened by oil-price shock, so 
does investment (see Tables 4 and 5).  
We establish a SVAR model to undertake a general equilibrium analysis of the 
impact of oil-price shock. According to the impulse response equation, oil-price increase 
can negatively affect output and investment, but positively affect inflation rate and interest 
rate. The impact on real economy, represented by real output and real investment, takes 
more longer to recover, which is far more permanent than that to price/monetary variables 
(CPI/PPI/I). 
On the base of the SVAR model, the effect of oil-price shock is decomposed into the 
short-term and long-term impacts. Our decomposition results show that the short-term 
impact, namely output decrease induced by the cut of capacity-utilization rate, is greater 
in the first 1 or 2 years, but the portion of the long-term impact, defined as the impact 
realized through an investment change, increases steadily and exceeds 50% at the 20th 
period. After the 21 periods, the long-term impact dominates, and maintains for quite 
some time.  
To mitigate the long-term impact of oil-price shocks in China, we like to highlight 
some measures that need to be taken. First, removing some unnecessary price restrictions 
can improve the market structure and price transmission mechanisms. Price adjustment 
can cushion cost increases to producers and prevent their profit rates, as well as 
investment, from sharp decrease. Second, measures expanding domestic and export 
demands are needed. The expanded demand can offset the cost increase caused by 
oil-price shock and stimulate output. Third, since investment determines the long-term 
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effect of oil-price shock, lower interest rate is needed to stimulate investment and 
counteract the adverse impact. A contractionary monetary policy subsequent to an 
oil-price shock can worsen the long-term output, being responsible for about two-thirds to 
three-quarters of the reduction in U.S. output subsequent to an oil shock. In our view, 
however, this is the area where more rigorous studies in China are needed to draw any 
further conclusion about the proper monetary policy in China. Last but not least, 
improving energy efficiency is widely considered as the most effective and lowest cost 
means of cutting energy use in responding to high energy prices. Strengthening 
energy-saving efforts via both technology improvements and sectoral adjustments towards 
a less energy-intensive economic structure and scaling up the use of renewable energies 
will enable China to sustain its economic growth while preserving the environment. That 
would be a win-win situation for China and the planet. 
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Appendix 1 
Both CPI and PPI are the widely used price indices, but have different economic 
meanings. PPI covers a range of more than 4000 sorts of products, most of which are 
means of production, and only one-third of those products are means of livelihood in 
China. On the contrary, only less than a half of CPI goods are industrial commercial goods, 
whereas others are food and services. The compositions of CPI and PPI are different, let 
alone their statistical definition. It should thus come as no surprise that the relationship 
and causality between CPI and PPI are not very significant.  
Since CPI goods are all final products, CPI can be interpreted as the price index of 
social output. Increase in output price will surely abate aggregate demand, and thus 
decrease output. The negative relationship between CPI and output (IAV) is robust, both 
theoretically and empirically as indicated in Tables 2 and 3. However, the direct impact of 
PPI is ambiguous, because most PPI goods are industrial intermediate products, which are 
outputs of upper-stream industry, and at the same time inputs of down-stream industry. 
PPI covers products of a long chain of industry, so its increase may indicate higher costs 
to some section, but higher income to others. For more detailed analysis, we need to go 
down into industries, to examine the relationship between price indices and profit for each 
industry separately. A difference equation is used in this analysis: 
CNPICPIPPIPFTD i +++=)( ; 
CNPICPIPPIPFTRD i +++=)( , 
where D(PFTi) / D(PFTRi) stands for the first-order difference of profit/profit rate of the 
ith industry in Table A1; PFTi and PFTRi are seasonal adjusted and logarithm converted. 
The coefficients of this model are listed in Table A1 in the order from upper- to 
down-stream industries.  
 
Table A1  
Relationship between price indices and profit by industry 
Profit  Profit rate 
Industries 
PPI CPI  PPI CPI 
Oil industry 6.99* 1.27  1.46* -0.10 
Refinery -297.24* 51.73  -0.01 -0.78* 
Nonferrous metals processing 5.07 -4.75  0.13* -0.09 
Steel-making & processing 3.01 -1.36  0.27* -0.17* 
Chemical industry 5.45 -5.19  0.24* -0.20* 
Chemical fiber industry 3.29 -0.91  0.27* -0.22* 
Machinery manufacturing -2.61 4.32*  -0.03 0.04* 
Electric power and heating industry -3.48 -11.42*  0.05 -0.31* 
Plastic industry -1.34 2.64  -0.02 0.02 
Agricultural products processing -0.93 4.22*   0.02 0.02 
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Food processing -1.89 3.66*  0.01 0.02 
Medicine and pharmaceutical industry -3.05 4.61*  -0.06 0.06* 
Textile industry -1.69 3.33  -0.01 0.01 
Garment industry -3.209 5.12*  -0.03 0.04* 
Notes: Coefficients of Auto-Regressive Equations; * 10% significance level. 
 
As shown in Table A1, different industries respond to inflation differently: 
upper-stream industries (including oil industry, nonferrous metals processing, 
steel-making & processing, chemical industry and chemical fiber industry) tend to be 
positively related to PPI but negatively to CPI (Refinery industry is a special case); 
down-stream industries (including machinery manufacturing, plastic industry, food 
processing, medicine and pharmaceutical industry, textile industry and garment industry) 
tend to respond otherwise. To explain this, we need to look into the Chinese price policies.  
Price controls in China are focused mainly on two kinds of goods: fundamental 
industrial raw materials and CPI commodities, but the intermediate products are mostly 
free from policy restrictions. The price controls toward raw materials have been 
attempting to insulate domestic industry from fluctuations in international markets, and 
those towards CPI commodities have been aiming to improve the stability of living costs. 
This structure of price control has fixed the prices of foremost inputs and final outputs of 
the whole industrial production. An increase in PPI means higher price for outputs and 
thus higher profits for upper-stream industries, given the fixed prices of raw materials. 
However, higher PPI means higher prices for inputs, which will cut the profits in 
down-stream industries.  
This duality in feature of PPI has made its impact on profit rates ambiguous. 
However, with the increasing dependence on imported industrial raw materials, like crude 
oil, iron ore and certain kinds of farm products in China, controlling the raw material 
prices is getting more and more difficult and impractical. If the price controls toward CPI 
commodities remain prevalent in China, the impact of PPI increase is very likely to 
become negative.  
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 Appendix 2 
Fig. A2 shows the impulse response in the VEC model with the same variables and 
parameters as the SVAR model. According to the VEC impulse response analysis, 
oil-price shock has the negative impact on output and investment. Interest rate goes up in 
the short term and then drops below the initial level to stimulate economic growth baffled 
by high-oil price. However, according to the VEC model, the long-term impacts converge 
to a non-zero constant decided by the cointegration equation, which marks the main 
difference between the VEC results and the SVAR results.  
 
Fig. A2  
Impulse response of macroeconomic variables to one S.D. innovation in oil price in VEC 
model 
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